The impact of bailouts on political turnover and sovereign default risk

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PREIN, Timm M., Almuth SCHOLL, 2021. The impact of bailouts on political turnover and sovereign default risk. In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. Elsevier. 124, 104065. ISSN 0165-1889. eISSN 1879-1743. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jedc.2020.104065

@article{Prein2021impac-52551, title={The impact of bailouts on political turnover and sovereign default risk}, year={2021}, doi={10.1016/j.jedc.2020.104065}, volume={124}, issn={0165-1889}, journal={Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control}, author={Prein, Timm M. and Scholl, Almuth}, note={Article Number: 104065} }

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