Challenging the majority rule in matters of truth
| Type of Publication: | Journal article |
| Publication status: | Published |
| Author: | Lahno, Bernd |
| Year of publication: | 2014 |
| Published in: | Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics ; 7 (2014), 2. - pp. 54-72. - Erasmus Institute for Philosophy and Economics. - eISSN 1876-9098 |
| DOI (citable link): | https://dx.doi.org/10.23941/ejpe.v7i2.167 |
| Summary: |
The majority rule has caught much attention in recent debate about the aggregation of judgments. But its role in finding the truth is limited. A majority of expert judgments is not necessarily authoritative, even if all experts are equally competent, if they make their judgments independently of each other, and if all the judgments are based on the same source of (good) evidence. In this paper I demonstrate this limitation by presenting a simple counterexample and a related general result. I pave the way for this argument by introducing a Bayesian model of evidence and expert judgment in order to give a precise account of the basic problem.
|
| Subject (DDC): | 100 Philosophy |
| Keywords: | competence, evidence, social epistemology, testimony, trust in experts, two-expert problem |
| Refereed: | Yes |
Cite This
Files in this item
| Files | Size | Format | View |
|---|---|---|---|
|
There are no files associated with this item. |
|||
LAHNO, Bernd, 2014. Challenging the majority rule in matters of truth. In: Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics. Erasmus Institute for Philosophy and Economics. 7(2), pp. 54-72. eISSN 1876-9098. Available under: doi: 10.23941/ejpe.v7i2.167
@article{Lahno2014-12-01Chall-51611, title={Challenging the majority rule in matters of truth}, year={2014}, doi={10.23941/ejpe.v7i2.167}, number={2}, volume={7}, journal={Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics}, pages={54--72}, author={Lahno, Bernd} }
<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/51611"> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/40"/> <dc:creator>Lahno, Bernd</dc:creator> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/40"/> <dcterms:title>Challenging the majority rule in matters of truth</dcterms:title> <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">The majority rule has caught much attention in recent debate about the aggregation of judgments. But its role in finding the truth is limited. A majority of expert judgments is not necessarily authoritative, even if all experts are equally competent, if they make their judgments independently of each other, and if all the judgments are based on the same source of (good) evidence. In this paper I demonstrate this limitation by presenting a simple counterexample and a related general result. I pave the way for this argument by introducing a Bayesian model of evidence and expert judgment in order to give a precise account of the basic problem.</dcterms:abstract> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2020-11-03T09:04:41Z</dcterms:available> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dcterms:issued>2014-12-01</dcterms:issued> <dc:contributor>Lahno, Bernd</dc:contributor> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2020-11-03T09:04:41Z</dc:date> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/jspui"/> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/51611"/> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>
This item appears in the following Collection(s)
Search KOPS
Browse
My Account
