Trust, Reputation, And Exit in Exchange Relationships

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LAHNO, Bernd, 1995. Trust, Reputation, And Exit in Exchange Relationships. In: The Journal of Conflict Resolution. Sage. 39(3), pp. 495-510. ISSN 0022-0027. eISSN 1552-8766. Available under: doi: 10.1177/0022002795039003005

@article{Lahno1995Trust-51584, title={Trust, Reputation, And Exit in Exchange Relationships}, url={https://www.jstor.org/stable/174578}, year={1995}, doi={10.1177/0022002795039003005}, number={3}, volume={39}, issn={0022-0027}, journal={The Journal of Conflict Resolution}, pages={495--510}, author={Lahno, Bernd} }

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