Trust and Strategic Rationality

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LAHNO, Bernd, 1995. Trust and Strategic Rationality. In: Rationality and Society. Sage. 7(4), pp. 442-464. ISSN 1043-4631. eISSN 1461-7358. Available under: doi: 10.1177/104346319500700408

@article{Lahno1995Trust-51563, title={Trust and Strategic Rationality}, year={1995}, doi={10.1177/104346319500700408}, number={4}, volume={7}, issn={1043-4631}, journal={Rationality and Society}, pages={442--464}, author={Lahno, Bernd} }

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