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Portfolio Allocation and Policy Compromises : How and Why the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats Formed a Coalition Government

Portfolio Allocation and Policy Compromises : How and Why the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats Formed a Coalition Government

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DEBUS, Marc, 2011. Portfolio Allocation and Policy Compromises : How and Why the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats Formed a Coalition Government. In: The Political Quarterly. Wiley-Blackwell. 82(2), pp. 293-304. ISSN 0032-3179. eISSN 1467-923X. Available under: doi: 10.1111/j.1467-923X.2011.02191.x

@article{Debus2011-06-14Portf-51313, title={Portfolio Allocation and Policy Compromises : How and Why the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats Formed a Coalition Government}, year={2011}, doi={10.1111/j.1467-923X.2011.02191.x}, number={2}, volume={82}, issn={0032-3179}, journal={The Political Quarterly}, pages={293--304}, author={Debus, Marc} }

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