Limits of the Conscious Control of Action

Cite This

Files in this item

Files Size Format View

There are no files associated with this item.

SCHMITZ, Michael, 2011. Limits of the Conscious Control of Action. In: Social Psychology. Hogrefe. 42(1), pp. 93-98. ISSN 1864-9335. eISSN 2151-2590. Available under: doi: 10.1027/1864-9335/a000047

@article{Schmitz2011-01Limit-51193, title={Limits of the Conscious Control of Action}, year={2011}, doi={10.1027/1864-9335/a000047}, number={1}, volume={42}, issn={1864-9335}, journal={Social Psychology}, pages={93--98}, author={Schmitz, Michael} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/51193"> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/jspui"/> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/40"/> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/51193"/> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/40"/> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2020-10-05T11:51:47Z</dcterms:available> <dcterms:title>Limits of the Conscious Control of Action</dcterms:title> <dc:contributor>Schmitz, Michael</dc:contributor> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dcterms:issued>2011-01</dcterms:issued> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">After outlining why the notion of conscious control of action matters to us and after distinguishing different challenges to that notion, the contribution focuses on the challenge posed by the literature on unconscious goal pursuit. Based on a conceptual clarification of the notion of consciousness, I argue that the understanding of consciousness in that literature is too restricted. The possibility that the behaviors reported can be accounted for by nonconceptual forms of consciousness, such as emotions and motor experiences, rather than by – conscious or unconscious – conceptual level intentions tends to be disregarded, even though it promises to be empirically fruitful.</dcterms:abstract> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2020-10-05T11:51:47Z</dc:date> <dc:creator>Schmitz, Michael</dc:creator> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Search KOPS


Browse

My Account