Contacts Matter : Local Governance and the Targeting of Social Pensions in Bangladesh
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We present evidence on the extent and possible causes of mistargeting of a largescale social-pension program in Bangladesh. The evidence stems from surveys and lab-in-the-field experiments that we ran in eight different unions (municipalities) with three different groups: (i) a random sample of the elderly population (potential bene ciaries), (ii) a random sample of newly selected bene ciaries, and (iii) the local government representatives, who were in charge of the last round of selections. On the one hand, our (pre-registered) analysis suggests that personal relationships are crucial for being selected as a bene ciary, which might indicate corruption. On the other hand, our results strongly suggest that a severe lack of state capacity (e.g., knowledge of the o cial rules and procedures on the part of the politicians) is the most important reason for the very poor targeting performance of the local governments.
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ASRI, Viola, Kumar BISWAS, Sebastian FEHRLER, Urs FISCHBACHER, Katharina MICHAELOWA, Atonu RABBANI, 2020. Contacts Matter : Local Governance and the Targeting of Social Pensions in BangladeshBibTex
@techreport{Asri2020-06Conta-51145, year={2020}, title={Contacts Matter : Local Governance and the Targeting of Social Pensions in Bangladesh}, author={Asri, Viola and Biswas, Kumar and Fehrler, Sebastian and Fischbacher, Urs and Michaelowa, Katharina and Rabbani, Atonu} }
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