Conditional Solidarity : A Comparative Analysis of Government Egalitarianism and Benefit Conditionalization in Boom and Bust

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2018
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Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis ; 20 (2018), 5. - pp. 451-468. - Taylor & Francis. - ISSN 1387-6988. - eISSN 1572-5448
Abstract
Surveys show that welfare benefits are regarded as more legitimate if the beneficiaries are perceived as victims of systemic circumstances; that their legitimacy is sensitive to economic context; and that egalitarians are more supportive of benefits. Applying these insights to macro-comparative research, this paper shows that “conditional solidarity” – not partisanship – explains the puzzling countercyclical policy pattern of “conditionalization in good times” that characterizes changes in access to unemployment insurance in the OECD. The argument is that the effect of a government’s egalitarian views depends on the business cycle because the legitimacy of benefits is inversely related to macroeconomic performance.
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320 Politics
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economic performance; comparative welfare research; conditional solidarity; egalitarianism; regression
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ISO 690HORN, Alexander, 2018. Conditional Solidarity : A Comparative Analysis of Government Egalitarianism and Benefit Conditionalization in Boom and Bust. In: Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis. Taylor & Francis. 20(5), pp. 451-468. ISSN 1387-6988. eISSN 1572-5448. Available under: doi: 10.1080/13876988.2017.1368192
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@article{Horn2018-10-20Condi-50835,
  year={2018},
  doi={10.1080/13876988.2017.1368192},
  title={Conditional Solidarity : A Comparative Analysis of Government Egalitarianism and Benefit Conditionalization in Boom and Bust},
  number={5},
  volume={20},
  issn={1387-6988},
  journal={Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis},
  pages={451--468},
  author={Horn, Alexander}
}
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