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Honesty and Self-Selection into Cheap Talk

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FEHRLER, Sebastian, Urs FISCHBACHER, Maik T. SCHNEIDER, 2020. Honesty and Self-Selection into Cheap Talk. In: The Economic Journal. Oxford University Press (OUP). 130(632), pp. 2468-2496. ISSN 0013-0133. eISSN 1468-0297. Available under: doi: 10.1093/ej/ueaa028

@article{Fehrler2020-11-23Hones-50230, title={Honesty and Self-Selection into Cheap Talk}, year={2020}, doi={10.1093/ej/ueaa028}, number={632}, volume={130}, issn={0013-0133}, journal={The Economic Journal}, pages={2468--2496}, author={Fehrler, Sebastian and Fischbacher, Urs and Schneider, Maik T.} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="" xmlns:dc="" xmlns:rdf="" xmlns:bibo="" xmlns:dspace="" xmlns:foaf="" xmlns:void="" xmlns:xsd="" > <rdf:Description rdf:about=""> <dc:creator>Schneider, Maik T.</dc:creator> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="">2020-07-14T10:25:41Z</dcterms:available> <dcterms:issued>2020-11-23</dcterms:issued> <dc:contributor>Schneider, Maik T.</dc:contributor> <bibo:uri rdf:resource=""/> <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights> <dc:creator>Fischbacher, Urs</dc:creator> <dc:contributor>Fischbacher, Urs</dc:contributor> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource=""/> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource=""/> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource=""/> <dc:creator>Fehrler, Sebastian</dc:creator> <dc:contributor>Fehrler, Sebastian</dc:contributor> <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource=""/> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dc:date rdf:datatype="">2020-07-14T10:25:41Z</dc:date> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/jspui"/> <dcterms:title>Honesty and Self-Selection into Cheap Talk</dcterms:title> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">In many situations, people can lie strategically for their own benefit. Since individuals differ with respect to their willingness to lie, the credibility of statements will crucially depend on who self-selects into such cheap-talk situations. We study this process in a two-stage political competition setting. At the entry stage, potential candidates compete in a contest to become their party’s candidate in an election. At the election stage, the nominated candidates campaign by making promises to voters. Confirming the model’s key prediction, we find in our experiment that dishonest people over-proportionally self-select into the political race and thereby lower voters’ welfare.</dcterms:abstract> <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource=""/> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

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