Buying Supermajorities in the Lab

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FEHRLER, Sebastian, Maik T. SCHNEIDER, 2019. Buying Supermajorities in the Lab

@techreport{Fehrler2019Buyin-50218, series={IZA Discussion Papers}, title={Buying Supermajorities in the Lab}, url={https://www.iza.org/de/publications/dp/12477/buying-supermajorities-in-the-lab}, year={2019}, number={12477}, author={Fehrler, Sebastian and Schneider, Maik T.} }

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