Buying Supermajorities in the Lab

Fehrler, Sebastian; Schneider, Maik T.

Buying Supermajorities in the Lab

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Date

2019

Authors

Fehrler, Sebastian

Schneider, Maik T.

Series

IZA Discussion Papers; 12477

Link to the license

In Copyright

Collections

Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Exzellenzcluster "Die politische Dimension von Ungleichheit"

Publication type

Working Paper/Technical Report

Publication status

Published

Abstract

Many decisions taken in legislatures or committees are subject to lobbying efforts. A seminal contribution to the literature on vote-buying is the legislative lobbying model pioneered by Groseclose and Snyder (1996), which predicts that lobbies will optimally form supermajorities in many cases. Providing the first empirical assessment of this prominent model, we test its central predictions in the laboratory. While the model assumes sequential moves, we relax this assumption in additional treatments with simultaneous moves. We find that lobbies buy supermajorities as predicted by the theory. Our results also provide supporting evidence for most comparative statics predictions of the legislative lobbying model with respect to lobbies' willingness to pay and legislators' preferences. Most of these results carry over to the simultaneous-move set-up but the predictive power of the model declines.

Subject (DDC)

330 Economics

Keywords

legislative lobbying, vote-buying, Colonel Blotto, multi-battlefield contests, experimental political economy

Cite This

ISO 690

FEHRLER, Sebastian, Maik T. SCHNEIDER, 2019. Buying Supermajorities in the Lab

BibTex

@techreport{Fehrler2019Buyin-50218,
  year={2019},
  series={IZA Discussion Papers},
  title={Buying Supermajorities in the Lab},
  number={12477},
  url={https://www.iza.org/de/publications/dp/12477/buying-supermajorities-in-the-lab},
  author={Fehrler, Sebastian and Schneider, Maik T.}
}

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URL of original publication

https://www.iza.org/de/publications/dp/12477/buying-supermajorities-in-the-lab

Test date of URL

2020-07-13

Bibliography of Konstanz

Yes