Central bank independence and the monetary instrument problem

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NIEMANN, Stefan, Paul PICHLER, Gerhard SORGER, 2013. Central bank independence and the monetary instrument problem. In: International Economic Review. Wiley. 54(3), pp. 1031-1055. ISSN 0020-6598. eISSN 1468-2354. Available under: doi: 10.1111/iere.12027

@article{Niemann2013-08Centr-49439, title={Central bank independence and the monetary instrument problem}, year={2013}, doi={10.1111/iere.12027}, number={3}, volume={54}, issn={0020-6598}, journal={International Economic Review}, pages={1031--1055}, author={Niemann, Stefan and Pichler, Paul and Sorger, Gerhard} }

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