Aufgrund von Vorbereitungen auf eine neue Version von KOPS, können kommenden Montag und Dienstag keine Publikationen eingereicht werden. (Due to preparations for a new version of KOPS, no publications can be submitted next Monday and Tuesday.)
Type of Publication: | Journal article |
Publication status: | Published |
Author: | Niemann, Stefan; Pichler, Paul; Sorger, Gerhard |
Year of publication: | 2013 |
Published in: | International Economic Review ; 54 (2013), 3. - pp. 1031-1055. - Wiley. - ISSN 0020-6598. - eISSN 1468-2354 |
DOI (citable link): | https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/iere.12027 |
Summary: |
We study the monetary instrument problem in a dynamic noncooperative game between separate, discretionary, fiscal and monetary policy makers. We show that monetary instruments are equivalent only if the policy makers' objectives are perfectly aligned; otherwise an instrument problem exists. When the central bank is benevolent while the fiscal authority is short‐sighted relative to the private sector, excessive public spending and debt emerge under a money growth policy but not under an interest rate policy. Despite this property, the interest rate is not necessarily the optimal instrument.
|
Subject (DDC): | 330 Economics |
Refereed: | Yes |
Files | Size | Format | View |
---|---|---|---|
There are no files associated with this item. |
NIEMANN, Stefan, Paul PICHLER, Gerhard SORGER, 2013. Central bank independence and the monetary instrument problem. In: International Economic Review. Wiley. 54(3), pp. 1031-1055. ISSN 0020-6598. eISSN 1468-2354. Available under: doi: 10.1111/iere.12027
@article{Niemann2013-08Centr-49439, title={Central bank independence and the monetary instrument problem}, year={2013}, doi={10.1111/iere.12027}, number={3}, volume={54}, issn={0020-6598}, journal={International Economic Review}, pages={1031--1055}, author={Niemann, Stefan and Pichler, Paul and Sorger, Gerhard} }
<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/49439"> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">We study the monetary instrument problem in a dynamic noncooperative game between separate, discretionary, fiscal and monetary policy makers. We show that monetary instruments are equivalent only if the policy makers' objectives are perfectly aligned; otherwise an instrument problem exists. When the central bank is benevolent while the fiscal authority is short‐sighted relative to the private sector, excessive public spending and debt emerge under a money growth policy but not under an interest rate policy. Despite this property, the interest rate is not necessarily the optimal instrument.</dcterms:abstract> <dcterms:issued>2013-08</dcterms:issued> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2020-05-08T07:09:30Z</dcterms:available> <dc:creator>Niemann, Stefan</dc:creator> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/jspui"/> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/49439"/> <dcterms:title>Central bank independence and the monetary instrument problem</dcterms:title> <dc:contributor>Pichler, Paul</dc:contributor> <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/> <dc:contributor>Niemann, Stefan</dc:contributor> <dc:creator>Sorger, Gerhard</dc:creator> <dc:contributor>Sorger, Gerhard</dc:contributor> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dc:creator>Pichler, Paul</dc:creator> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2020-05-08T07:09:30Z</dc:date> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>