Optimal fiscal and monetary policies in the face of rare disasters

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NIEMANN, Stefan, Paul PICHLER, 2011. Optimal fiscal and monetary policies in the face of rare disasters. In: European Economic Review. Elsevier. 55(1), pp. 75-92. ISSN 0014-2921. eISSN 1873-572X. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2010.11.001

@article{Niemann2011-01Optim-49435, title={Optimal fiscal and monetary policies in the face of rare disasters}, year={2011}, doi={10.1016/j.euroecorev.2010.11.001}, number={1}, volume={55}, issn={0014-2921}, journal={European Economic Review}, pages={75--92}, author={Niemann, Stefan and Pichler, Paul} }

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