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Agenda control and reciprocity in sequential voting decisions

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FISCHBACHER, Urs, Simeon SCHUDY, 2020. Agenda control and reciprocity in sequential voting decisions. In: Economic Inquiry. Wiley. 58(4), pp. 1813-1829. ISSN 0095-2583. eISSN 1465-7295. Available under: doi: 10.1111/ecin.12898

@article{Fischbacher2020-10Agend-49284, title={Agenda control and reciprocity in sequential voting decisions}, year={2020}, doi={10.1111/ecin.12898}, number={4}, volume={58}, issn={0095-2583}, journal={Economic Inquiry}, pages={1813--1829}, author={Fischbacher, Urs and Schudy, Simeon} }

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