Upward Income Mobility and Legislator Support for Education Policies

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BELLANI, Luna, Vigile Marie FABELLA, 2018. Upward Income Mobility and Legislator Support for Education Policies

@techreport{Bellani2018Upwar-47996, series={IZA Discussion Papers}, title={Upward Income Mobility and Legislator Support for Education Policies}, url={https://ideas.repec.org/p/iza/izadps/dp11324.html}, year={2018}, number={11324}, author={Bellani, Luna and Fabella, Vigile Marie} }

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