The Impact of Bailouts on Political Turnover and Sovereign Default Risk

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PREIN, Timm M., Almuth SCHOLL, 2018. The Impact of Bailouts on Political Turnover and Sovereign Default Risk

@techreport{Prein2018Impac-47868, series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics}, title={The Impact of Bailouts on Political Turnover and Sovereign Default Risk}, url={https://ideas.repec.org/p/knz/dpteco/1804.html}, year={2018}, number={2018-04}, author={Prein, Timm M. and Scholl, Almuth} }

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