The Political Economy of Redistribution Policy
| Type of Publication: | Contribution to a collection |
| Publication status: | Published |
| Author: | Bellani, Luna; Ursprung, Heinrich |
| Year of publication: | 2019 |
| Published in: | The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2 / Congleton, Roger D.; Grofman, Bernard; Voigt, Stefan (ed.). - New York : Oxford University Press, 2019. - pp. 520-541. - ISBN 978-0-19-046977-1 |
| DOI (citable link): | https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.24 |
| Summary: |
The authors review the literature on the public-choice analysis of redistribution policies. They restrict the discussion to redistribution in democracies and focus on policies that are pursued with the sole objective of redistributing initial endowments. Since generic models of redistribution in democracies lack equilibria, one needs to introduce structure-inducing rules to arrive at a models whose behavior realistically portrays observed redistribution patterns. These rules may relate to the economic relationships, political institutions, or to firmly established preferences, beliefs, and attitudes of voters. The chapter surveys the respective lines of argument in turn and then present the related empirical evidence.
|
| Subject (DDC): | 330 Economics |
| Keywords: | political economy, redistributive politics, preference for redistribution, POUM hypothesis, electoral competition, social status, social identity, biased perception |
| Bibliography of Konstanz: | Yes |
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BELLANI, Luna, Heinrich URSPRUNG, 2019. The Political Economy of Redistribution Policy. In: CONGLETON, Roger D., ed., Bernard GROFMAN, ed., Stefan VOIGT, ed.. The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2. New York:Oxford University Press, pp. 520-541. ISBN 978-0-19-046977-1. Available under: doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.24
@incollection{Bellani2019-02-28Polit-47358, title={The Political Economy of Redistribution Policy}, year={2019}, doi={10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.24}, isbn={978-0-19-046977-1}, address={New York}, publisher={Oxford University Press}, booktitle={The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2}, pages={520--541}, editor={Congleton, Roger D. and Grofman, Bernard and Voigt, Stefan}, author={Bellani, Luna and Ursprung, Heinrich} }
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