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The Dose Does it : Punishment and Cooperation in Dynamic Public-Good Games

The Dose Does it : Punishment and Cooperation in Dynamic Public-Good Games

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ROCKENBACH, Bettina, Irenaeus WOLFF, 2019. The Dose Does it : Punishment and Cooperation in Dynamic Public-Good Games. In: Review of Behavioral Economics. 6(1), pp. 19-37. ISSN 2326-6198. eISSN 2326-6201. Available under: doi: 10.1561/105.00000084

@article{Rockenbach2019Punis-46606, title={The Dose Does it : Punishment and Cooperation in Dynamic Public-Good Games}, year={2019}, doi={10.1561/105.00000084}, number={1}, volume={6}, issn={2326-6198}, journal={Review of Behavioral Economics}, pages={19--37}, author={Rockenbach, Bettina and Wolff, Irenaeus} }

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