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Cheating monkeys undermine group strength in enemy territory

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CROFOOT, Margaret Chatham, Ian C. GILBY, 2012. Cheating monkeys undermine group strength in enemy territory. In: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America : PNAS. 109(2), pp. 501-505. ISSN 0027-8424. eISSN 1091-6490. Available under: doi: 10.1073/pnas.1115937109

@article{Crofoot2012-01-10Cheat-46005, title={Cheating monkeys undermine group strength in enemy territory}, year={2012}, doi={10.1073/pnas.1115937109}, number={2}, volume={109}, issn={0027-8424}, journal={Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America : PNAS}, pages={501--505}, author={Crofoot, Margaret Chatham and Gilby, Ian C.} }

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