Aufgrund von Vorbereitungen auf eine neue Version von KOPS, können derzeit keine Publikationen eingereicht werden. (Due to preparations for a new version of KOPS, no publications can be submitted currently.)
Type of Publication: | Journal article |
URI (citable link): | http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-opus-24471 |
Author: | Schneider, Gerald; Finke, Daniel; Baltz, Konstantin |
Year of publication: | 2007 |
Published in: | Journal of European Public Policy ; 14 (2007), 3. - pp. 444-459 |
DOI (citable link): | https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501760701243814 |
Summary: |
Theories of interest intermediation maintain that the formation of bargaining positions in the European Union follows a distinctive bargaining style. This article evaluates such claims empirically. It compares the predictive accuracy of Nash bargaining models which take the salient features of five types of interest intermediation into account. We show that the interaction between government agencies, interest groups and parties in the formation of EU legislation is largely étatiste. When important private interests are at stake, the pattern is also quite often clientelistic or corporatist. The dominance of the state in the less politicized decision-making processes is apparent in all four countries under consideration: Finland, Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands. Consociationalist arrangements are rare in this arena of public policy-making.
|
Subject (DDC): | 320 Politics |
Keywords: | Applied bargaining theory, domestic politics, European Union, interest intermediation, Nash bargaining solution (NBS), model evaluation |
Link to License: | In Copyright |
Bibliography of Konstanz: | Yes |
SCHNEIDER, Gerald, Daniel FINKE, Konstantin BALTZ, 2007. With a little help from the state : interest intermediation in the domestic pre-negotiations of EU legislation. In: Journal of European Public Policy. 14(3), pp. 444-459. Available under: doi: 10.1080/13501760701243814
@article{Schneider2007littl-4327, title={With a little help from the state : interest intermediation in the domestic pre-negotiations of EU legislation}, year={2007}, doi={10.1080/13501760701243814}, number={3}, volume={14}, journal={Journal of European Public Policy}, pages={444--459}, author={Schneider, Gerald and Finke, Daniel and Baltz, Konstantin} }
<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/4327"> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-24T10:13:32Z</dc:date> <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/4327"/> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/42"/> <dc:contributor>Baltz, Konstantin</dc:contributor> <dcterms:issued>2007</dcterms:issued> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-24T10:13:32Z</dcterms:available> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dc:creator>Finke, Daniel</dc:creator> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/jspui"/> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">Theories of interest intermediation maintain that the formation of bargaining positions in the European Union follows a distinctive bargaining style. This article evaluates such claims empirically. It compares the predictive accuracy of Nash bargaining models which take the salient features of five types of interest intermediation into account. We show that the interaction between government agencies, interest groups and parties in the formation of EU legislation is largely étatiste. When important private interests are at stake, the pattern is also quite often clientelistic or corporatist. The dominance of the state in the less politicized decision-making processes is apparent in all four countries under consideration: Finland, Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands. Consociationalist arrangements are rare in this arena of public policy-making.</dcterms:abstract> <dcterms:bibliographicCitation>First publ. in: Journal of European Public Policy 14 (2007), 3, pp. 444-459</dcterms:bibliographicCitation> <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format> <dc:creator>Schneider, Gerald</dc:creator> <dcterms:title>With a little help from the state : interest intermediation in the domestic pre-negotiations of EU legislation</dcterms:title> <dc:contributor>Finke, Daniel</dc:contributor> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/42"/> <dc:creator>Baltz, Konstantin</dc:creator> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/4327/1/With_a_little_help_from_the_state_JEPP_2007.pdf"/> <dc:contributor>Schneider, Gerald</dc:contributor> <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/4327/1/With_a_little_help_from_the_state_JEPP_2007.pdf"/> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>
With_a_little_help_from_the_state_JEPP_2007.pdf | 798 |