Journal article:
Discriminating decentralization : federalism and the handling of asylum applications in Switzerland, 1988-1996

No Thumbnail Available
Date
2000
Editors
Holzer, Thomas
Widmer, Thomas
relationships.isEditorOf
Contact
Journal ISSN
Electronic ISSN
ISBN
Bibliographical data
Publisher
Series
DOI (citable link)
ArXiv-ID
International patent number
Link to the license
Project
EU project number
Open Access publication
Restricted until
Title in another language
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Journal Issue
Publication type
Journal article
Publication status
Abstract
Federalism belongs to those institutions that usually attract more admirers than critics. This study investigates whether decentralized decision making in the asylum domain undermines the principle of equality in the handling of individual cases. The externalities that power delegation creates are examined, and a principal/agent framework is developed to show how state discretion in the implementation of a unifying federal measure arises. The model distinguishes between positive and negative discrimination in the acceptance of asylum applications. The empirical analysis of approximately 180,000 cases demonstrates that the probability of negative discrimination is partly a function of the organizational principles that characterize the asylum policies of the 26 Swiss states (cantons).
Summary in another language
Subject (DDC)
320 Politics
Keywords
Federalism , Asylum Applications , Switzerland
Published in
Journal of conflict resolution ; 44 (2000), 2. - pp. 250-275
Conference
Review
undefined / . - undefined, undefined. - (undefined; undefined)
Cite This
ISO 690HOLZER, Thomas, Gerald SCHNEIDER, Thomas WIDMER, 2000. Discriminating decentralization : federalism and the handling of asylum applications in Switzerland, 1988-1996. In: Journal of conflict resolution. 44(2), pp. 250-275. Available under: doi: 10.1177/0022002700044002005
BibTex
@article{Holzer2000Discr-4305,
  year={2000},
  doi={10.1177/0022002700044002005},
  title={Discriminating decentralization : federalism and the handling of asylum applications in Switzerland, 1988-1996},
  number={2},
  volume={44},
  journal={Journal of conflict resolution},
  pages={250--275},
  author={Holzer, Thomas and Schneider, Gerald and Widmer, Thomas}
}
RDF
<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/4305">
    <dc:contributor>Widmer, Thomas</dc:contributor>
    <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>
    <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/4305"/>
    <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights>
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-24T10:13:27Z</dcterms:available>
    <dc:creator>Holzer, Thomas</dc:creator>
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <dcterms:issued>2000</dcterms:issued>
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
    <dcterms:bibliographicCitation>First publ. in: Journal of conflict resolution, Vol. 44 No. 2, April 2000 250-275</dcterms:bibliographicCitation>
    <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/4305/1/holzerschneiderwidmerjcr2000.pdf"/>
    <dc:contributor>Schneider, Gerald</dc:contributor>
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-24T10:13:27Z</dc:date>
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">Federalism belongs to those institutions that usually attract more admirers than critics. This study investigates whether decentralized decision making in the asylum domain undermines the principle of equality in the handling of individual cases. The externalities that power delegation creates are examined, and a principal/agent framework is developed to show how state discretion in the implementation of a unifying federal measure arises. The model distinguishes between positive and negative discrimination in the acceptance of asylum applications. The empirical analysis of approximately 180,000 cases demonstrates that the probability of negative discrimination is partly a function of the organizational principles that characterize the asylum policies of the 26 Swiss states (cantons).</dcterms:abstract>
    <dcterms:title>Discriminating decentralization : federalism and the handling of asylum applications in Switzerland, 1988-1996</dcterms:title>
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
    <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/4305/1/holzerschneiderwidmerjcr2000.pdf"/>
    <dc:creator>Widmer, Thomas</dc:creator>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/42"/>
    <dc:creator>Schneider, Gerald</dc:creator>
    <dc:contributor>Holzer, Thomas</dc:contributor>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/42"/>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>
Internal note
xmlui.Submission.submit.DescribeStep.inputForms.label.kops_note_fromSubmitter
Contact
URL of original publication
Test date of URL
Examination date of dissertation
Method of financing
Comment on publication
Alliance license
Corresponding Authors der Uni Konstanz vorhanden
International Co-Authors
Bibliography of Konstanz
No
Refereed
Link to research data
Description of supplementary data