## The limitations of fair division : an experimental evaluation of three procedures

2004
##### Authors
Krämer, Ulrike Sabrina
Journal article
##### Published in
Journal of Conflict Resolution ; 48 (2004), 4. - pp. 506-524
##### Abstract
Mathematical procedures that promise an envy-free, equitable, and efficient solution to distributional conflicts have received widespread attention. Two fair-division mechanisms, adjusted Knaster and proportional Knaster, which are similar to the well-known adjusted-winner procedure, are compared with the less fair divide-and-choose mechanism. Results show that participants largely prefer the adjusted-Knaster procedure to the two alternatives. Adjusted Knaster, closely followed by proportional Knaster, also promises the highest average payoff. Yet the sophisticated mechanisms cease to perform better than divide-and-choose once actors receive the possibility to deviate from the mandatory bargaining protocols of fair-division procedures. The preference for adjusted and proportional Knaster is found to be a partial function of the participants psychological profile. The more antisocial a participant, the more likely this respondent is to opt for a procedure with a compensatory mechanism.
320 Politics
##### Keywords
fair division,experimental political science,bargaining,two-person games,proportional Knaster,adjusted winner,Knaster
##### Cite This
ISO 690SCHNEIDER, Gerald, Ulrike Sabrina KRÄMER, 2004. The limitations of fair division : an experimental evaluation of three procedures. In: Journal of Conflict Resolution. 48(4), pp. 506-524. Available under: doi: 10.1177/0022002704266148
BibTex
@article{Schneider2004limit-4228,
year={2004},
doi={10.1177/0022002704266148},
title={The limitations of fair division : an experimental evaluation of three procedures},
number={4},
volume={48},
journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution},
pages={506--524},
author={Schneider, Gerald and Krämer, Ulrike Sabrina}
}

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Yes