Interest groups and policy volatility

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BREUNIG, Christian, Chris KOSKI, 2018. Interest groups and policy volatility. In: Governance. 31(2), pp. 279-297. ISSN 0952-1895. eISSN 1468-0491. Available under: doi: 10.1111/gove.12288

@article{Breunig2018-04Inter-41960, title={Interest groups and policy volatility}, year={2018}, doi={10.1111/gove.12288}, number={2}, volume={31}, issn={0952-1895}, journal={Governance}, pages={279--297}, author={Breunig, Christian and Koski, Chris} }

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