KOPS - The Institutional Repository of the University of Konstanz

The monopolistic polluter under environmental liability law : incentives for abatement and R&D

Aufgrund von Vorbereitungen auf eine neue Version von KOPS, können kommenden Montag und Dienstag keine Publikationen eingereicht werden. (Due to preparations for a new version of KOPS, no publications can be submitted next Monday and Tuesday.)

The monopolistic polluter under environmental liability law : incentives for abatement and R&D

Cite This

Files in this item

Files Size Format View

There are no files associated with this item.

ENDRES, Alfred, Tim FRIEHE, 2013. The monopolistic polluter under environmental liability law : incentives for abatement and R&D. In: Social Choice and Welfare. 40(3), pp. 753-770. ISSN 0176-1714. eISSN 1432-217X. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s00355-011-0640-4

@article{Endres2013-03monop-41908, title={The monopolistic polluter under environmental liability law : incentives for abatement and R&D}, year={2013}, doi={10.1007/s00355-011-0640-4}, number={3}, volume={40}, issn={0176-1714}, journal={Social Choice and Welfare}, pages={753--770}, author={Endres, Alfred and Friehe, Tim} }

eng Friehe, Tim Friehe, Tim 2013-03 2018-03-24T12:10:51Z This article analyzes the output, abatement, and investment decisions made by a monopolistic polluter under environmental liability law. The model applied considers both integrated and end-of-pipe abatement technologies. We find that in the case of fixed technology, in many instances negligence produces more favorable results than strict liability in terms of social welfare. The reason is that output under strict liability is always less than first-best output, whereas output under negligence is not similarly limited. However, this ranking of liability rules may be reversed when technology is endogenous. Under such conditions investment in both integrated and end-of-pipe abatement technologies under negligence is guided by motives foreign to the social planner, whereas the polluter’s calculus under strict liability is similar to that of the social planner. The monopolistic polluter under environmental liability law : incentives for abatement and R&D Endres, Alfred Endres, Alfred 2018-03-24T12:10:51Z

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Search KOPS


Browse

My Account