Do hegemons distribute private goods? : a test of power-transition theory

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BUSSMANN, Margit, John R. ONEAL, 2007. Do hegemons distribute private goods? : a test of power-transition theory. In: Journal of Conflict Resolution. 51(1), pp. 88-111. Available under: doi: 10.1177/0022002706296178

@article{Bussmann2007hegem-4147, title={Do hegemons distribute private goods? : a test of power-transition theory}, year={2007}, doi={10.1177/0022002706296178}, number={1}, volume={51}, journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution}, pages={88--111}, author={Bussmann, Margit and Oneal, John R.} }

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