In Defence of a Minimal Conception of Epistemic Contextualism : a Reply to M. D. Ashfield’s Response
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| Type of Publication: | Journal article |
| Publication status: | Published |
| Author: | Freitag, Wolfgang |
| Year of publication: | 2013 |
| Published in: | Acta Analytica ; 28 (2013), 1. - pp. 127-137. - ISSN 0353-5150. - eISSN 1874-6349 |
| DOI (citable link): | https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12136-012-0168-y |
| Summary: |
Abstract The article responds to the objections M.D. Ashfield has raised to my recent attempt at saving epistemic contextualism from the knowability problem. First, it shows that Ashfield’s criticisms of my minimal conception of epistemic contextualism, even if correct, cannot reinstate the knowability problem. Second, it argues that these criticisms are based on a misunderstanding of the commitments of my minimal conception. I conclude that there is still no reason to maintain that epistemic contextualism has the knowability problem.
|
| Subject (DDC): | 100 Philosophy |
| Keywords: | Epistemic Contextualism; Minimal Contextualism; Knowability Problem; Factivity Problem; Scepticism |
| Bibliography of Konstanz: | Yes |
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FREITAG, Wolfgang, 2013. In Defence of a Minimal Conception of Epistemic Contextualism : a Reply to M. D. Ashfield’s Response. In: Acta Analytica. 28(1), pp. 127-137. ISSN 0353-5150. eISSN 1874-6349. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s12136-012-0168-y
@article{Freitag2013-03Defen-41378, title={In Defence of a Minimal Conception of Epistemic Contextualism : a Reply to M. D. Ashfield’s Response}, year={2013}, doi={10.1007/s12136-012-0168-y}, number={1}, volume={28}, issn={0353-5150}, journal={Acta Analytica}, pages={127--137}, author={Freitag, Wolfgang} }
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