Four Ways to Gettierize

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FREITAG, Wolfgang, 2012. Four Ways to Gettierize. GAP.7 : 7. Internationaler Kongress Nach-denken und Vordenken : Herausforderungen an die Philosophie. Bremen, Sep 14, 2009 - Sep 17, 2009. In: PETERSEN, Oliver, ed. and others. GAP.7 : Nachdenken und Vordenken : Herausforderungen an die Philosophie : Proceedings. Duisburg:Universität Duisburg-Essen, pp. 215-229. ISBN 978-3-00-036440-2

@inproceedings{Freitag2012Getti-41365, title={Four Ways to Gettierize}, year={2012}, isbn={978-3-00-036440-2}, address={Duisburg}, publisher={Universität Duisburg-Essen}, booktitle={GAP.7 : Nachdenken und Vordenken : Herausforderungen an die Philosophie : Proceedings}, pages={215--229}, editor={Petersen, Oliver}, author={Freitag, Wolfgang} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="" xmlns:dc="" xmlns:rdf="" xmlns:bibo="" xmlns:dspace="" xmlns:foaf="" xmlns:void="" xmlns:xsd="" > <rdf:Description rdf:about=""> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource=""/> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource=""/> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dcterms:issued>2012</dcterms:issued> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="">2018-02-15T10:11:49Z</dcterms:available> <dc:creator>Freitag, Wolfgang</dc:creator> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">Gettier problems arise when it is only by luck that a justified belief is true. Such a belief, though true in fact, might equally well have been false. Therefore, it is generally ruled out to be knowledge. Ruling out the Gettier problems means ruling out luck in a justified true belief. There are two ways in which truth might be a matter of luck, both exemplified by prominent Gettier examples. One is specific to the inferential cases, the other is specific to the noninfer-ential cases of (putative) knowledge. My aim is to show that the Gettier problem is of a more general sort, not restricted to (two kinds of) accidental truth. Where there is a true belief, there is not only truth; there is also belief. As the truth may be due to pure luck, so may the belief. From this it is but a short step to recognizing that in the inferential case there are two further ways in which a justified true belief may fail to be knowledge: it is not knowledge if it is due to pure luck that the epistemic subject has a certain inferential belief, and it is not knowledge if the procedure by which the subject arrives at her inferential belief is only accidentally valid. My task is to depict the four different ways of Gettierizing a prima facie legitimate claim to knowledge. But to show what can go wrong is to show what needs to be right. Pointing out the four kinds of Gettier problem will also be a means to attain a further goal: that of reveal-ing the structure of knowledge, and hence the structural constraints on any account thereof.</dcterms:abstract> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dc:date rdf:datatype="">2018-02-15T10:11:49Z</dc:date> <bibo:uri rdf:resource=""/> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/jspui"/> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource=""/> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource=""/> <dc:contributor>Freitag, Wolfgang</dc:contributor> <dcterms:title>Four Ways to Gettierize</dcterms:title> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

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