Parteipolitische Ämterpatronage in der Ministerialbürokratie der Bundesländer


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WETTENGEL, Philip, 2005. Parteipolitische Ämterpatronage in der Ministerialbürokratie der Bundesländer [Master thesis]

@mastersthesis{Wettengel2005Parte-4136, title={Parteipolitische Ämterpatronage in der Ministerialbürokratie der Bundesländer}, year={2005}, author={Wettengel, Philip} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="" xmlns:dc="" xmlns:rdf="" xmlns:bibo="" xmlns:dspace="" xmlns:foaf="" xmlns:void="" xmlns:xsd="" > <rdf:Description rdf:about=""> <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource=""/> <dc:creator>Wettengel, Philip</dc:creator> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource=""/> <dc:date rdf:datatype="">2011-03-24T10:12:46Z</dc:date> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="">2011-03-24T10:12:46Z</dcterms:available> <bibo:uri rdf:resource=""/> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource=""/> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">Ministerial bureaucrats are promoted before a looming election defeat. After a change of government the top positions are assigned to own party-members. These are common practices if one believes the press, the respective opposition and large parts of the political science and jurisprudence. Up to now, empirical studies are rare. The study at hand attempts to bridge this gap. The initial point is the idea that because of the tenure of the German civil servants, a new government has to systematically create new positions after an election in order to recruit loyal followers for the top positions. The job hierarchy should systematically rise before elections due to Versorgungspatronage . After a review of the available studies on party political patronage these hypotheses are tested with a new, self-constructed data set which contains information about the number of civil servants in twelve salary classes (A15 B10) in ten old German Laender from 1959 to 2004 and about the party political allocation of all Laender ministries in this period. The thesis arrives at the partly surprising conclusion that party political patronage in connection with government changes can only seldom be observed. The general opinion in the scientific literature that patronage is a common phenomena and results in an inflation of the civil service with each change of government must be rejected. The reasons for the tremendous expansion of the civil service have rather to be found apart from party political patronage.</dcterms:abstract> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource=""/> <dcterms:title>Parteipolitische Ämterpatronage in der Ministerialbürokratie der Bundesländer</dcterms:title> <dcterms:issued>2005</dcterms:issued> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/jspui"/> <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource=""/> <dc:contributor>Wettengel, Philip</dc:contributor> <dc:language>deu</dc:language> <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights> <dcterms:alternative>Party patronage in the ministerial bureaucracy at land-level</dcterms:alternative> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

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