Aufgrund von Vorbereitungen auf eine neue Version von KOPS, können kommenden Montag und Dienstag keine Publikationen eingereicht werden. (Due to preparations for a new version of KOPS, no publications can be submitted next Monday and Tuesday.)
Type of Publication: | Journal article |
URI (citable link): | http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-opus-78191 |
Author: | Bräuninger, Thomas |
Year of publication: | 2005 |
Published in: | Public Choice ; 125 (2005), 3/4. - pp. 409-429 |
DOI (citable link): | https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-005-3055-x |
Summary: |
Partisan models of budget politics largely concentrate on the size of government, budget deficits and debt, but most theories have little to say as to what the effect of party politics on both the size and the composition of budgets is. This paper seeks to extend previous literature in two directions. First, a model of spending preferences is developed that relates actors preferred level and allocation of expenditure to electoral gains from fiscal policies. Second, changes in both total expenditure and the expenditure mix of two budget categories are analyzed for the effect of parties spending preferences as stated in their election manifestos. Using data on 19 OECD countries from 1971 to 1999, the paper finds support for general partisan hypothesis. The results suggest that the actual spending preferences of parties matter whereas they do not indicate that parties of the left consistently differ from parties of the right in their spending behavior.
|
Subject (DDC): | 320 Politics |
Link to License: | In Copyright |
BRÄUNINGER, Thomas, 2005. A partisan model of government expenditure. In: Public Choice. 125(3/4), pp. 409-429. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s11127-005-3055-x
@article{Brauninger2005parti-4060, title={A partisan model of government expenditure}, year={2005}, doi={10.1007/s11127-005-3055-x}, number={3/4}, volume={125}, journal={Public Choice}, pages={409--429}, author={Bräuninger, Thomas} }
<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/4060"> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/42"/> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/52"/> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-24T10:10:11Z</dcterms:available> <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/4060/1/A_partisan_model_Braeuninger_2005.pdf"/> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/52"/> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/42"/> <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format> <dc:contributor>Bräuninger, Thomas</dc:contributor> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dcterms:issued>2005</dcterms:issued> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/jspui"/> <dcterms:bibliographicCitation>First publ. in: Public Choice 125 (2005), 3/4, pp. 409-429</dcterms:bibliographicCitation> <dc:creator>Bräuninger, Thomas</dc:creator> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">Partisan models of budget politics largely concentrate on the size of government, budget deficits and debt, but most theories have little to say as to what the effect of party politics on both the size and the composition of budgets is. This paper seeks to extend previous literature in two directions. First, a model of spending preferences is developed that relates actors preferred level and allocation of expenditure to electoral gains from fiscal policies. Second, changes in both total expenditure and the expenditure mix of two budget categories are analyzed for the effect of parties spending preferences as stated in their election manifestos. Using data on 19 OECD countries from 1971 to 1999, the paper finds support for general partisan hypothesis. The results suggest that the actual spending preferences of parties matter whereas they do not indicate that parties of the left consistently differ from parties of the right in their spending behavior.</dcterms:abstract> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dcterms:title>A partisan model of government expenditure</dcterms:title> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/4060"/> <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/4060/1/A_partisan_model_Braeuninger_2005.pdf"/> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-24T10:10:11Z</dc:date> <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>
A_partisan_model_Braeuninger_2005.pdf | 676 |