Altruists with Green Beards

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FEHR, Ernst, Urs FISCHBACHER, 2005. Altruists with Green Beards. In: Analyse & Kritik. 27(1), pp. 73-84. ISSN 0171-5860. eISSN 2365-9858. Available under: doi: 10.1515/auk-2005-0103

@article{Fehr2005-01-01Altru-39977, title={Altruists with Green Beards}, year={2005}, doi={10.1515/auk-2005-0103}, number={1}, volume={27}, issn={0171-5860}, journal={Analyse & Kritik}, pages={73--84}, author={Fehr, Ernst and Fischbacher, Urs} }

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