Reasons for Conflict : Lessons from Bargaining Experiments


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FALK, Armin, Ernst FEHR, Urs FISCHBACHER, 2003. Reasons for Conflict : Lessons from Bargaining Experiments. In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics : JITE. 159(1), pp. 171-187. ISSN 0932-4569. eISSN 1614-0559. Available under: doi: 10.1628/0932456032974925

@article{Falk2003-03-01Reaso-39974, title={Reasons for Conflict : Lessons from Bargaining Experiments}, year={2003}, doi={10.1628/0932456032974925}, number={1}, volume={159}, issn={0932-4569}, journal={Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics : JITE}, pages={171--187}, author={Falk, Armin and Fehr, Ernst and Fischbacher, Urs} }

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