Distributional Consequences and Intentions in a Model of Reciprocity

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FALK, Armin, Urs FISCHBACHER, 2001. Distributional Consequences and Intentions in a Model of Reciprocity. In: Annales d'Économie et de Statistique(63/64), pp. 111-129. ISSN 0769-489X. eISSN 2272-6497. Available under: doi: 10.2307/20076298

@article{Falk2001Distr-39967, title={Distributional Consequences and Intentions in a Model of Reciprocity}, year={2001}, doi={10.2307/20076298}, number={63/64}, issn={0769-489X}, journal={Annales d'Économie et de Statistique}, pages={111--129}, author={Falk, Armin and Fischbacher, Urs} }

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