Aufgrund von Vorbereitungen auf eine neue Version von KOPS, können derzeit keine Publikationen eingereicht werden. (Due to preparations for a new version of KOPS, no publications can be submitted currently.)
Type of Publication: | Journal article |
URI (citable link): | http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-opus-78789 |
Author: | Bräuninger, Thomas; König, Thomas |
Year of publication: | 1996 |
Published in: | Journal of Theoretical Politics ; 8 (1996), 3. - pp. 331-360 |
DOI (citable link): | https://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951692896008003002 |
Summary: |
Power in American and German multi-chamber legislation is determind either by an institutional or an internal coalition problem of all interlinked chambers. Hence, the complexity of multi-chamber systems relies on different subgames, different types of decision rules and different types of actors. Since collective actors such as parliaments or parliamentary chambers may not act as unitary actors, we examine the power distribution in both types of multi-cahmber legislation by a game-theoretical method with regard to institutional settings and specific legislative schemes . We argue that the Shapley index is the most appropiate method for the comparative analysis of multi chamber power. Our "parallel" research strategy is, thus, based on idividual and corporate Shapley power shares which are subsequently added to collective chamber power. Our comparison of Amerivan and German legislation starts with an analysis of two-chamber parliamentary bergaining. Whereas this application corresponds to the bicameral parliamentary decision stage of conciliation and amending, our second application of Policy Leadership studies the checks-and-balances of all executive and legislative chamber actors. A third application is related to the situation of unified and divided government, and here we examine the power effects of institutional settings and party-oriented strategies in both types of multi-chamber legislation. In Germany, unified government excludes opposition actors, whereas American unified and divided government refers to the president´s role in multi-chamber legislation.
|
Subject (DDC): | 320 Politics |
Keywords: | comparative politics, institutional power analysis, multichamber legislatures, game theory, Shapely index |
Link to License: | In Copyright |
BRÄUNINGER, Thomas, Thomas KÖNIG, 1996. Power and Political Coordination in American and German Multi-Chamber Legislation. In: Journal of Theoretical Politics. 8(3), pp. 331-360. Available under: doi: 10.1177/0951692896008003002
@article{Brauninger1996Power-3981, title={Power and Political Coordination in American and German Multi-Chamber Legislation}, year={1996}, doi={10.1177/0951692896008003002}, number={3}, volume={8}, journal={Journal of Theoretical Politics}, pages={331--360}, author={Bräuninger, Thomas and König, Thomas} }
<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/3981"> <dcterms:bibliographicCitation>First publ. in: Journal of Theoretical Politics 8 (1996), 3, pp. 331-360</dcterms:bibliographicCitation> <dc:contributor>König, Thomas</dc:contributor> <dc:creator>Bräuninger, Thomas</dc:creator> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dcterms:title>Power and Political Coordination in American and German Multi-Chamber Legislation</dcterms:title> <dc:creator>König, Thomas</dc:creator> <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">Power in American and German multi-chamber legislation is determind either by an institutional or an internal coalition problem of all interlinked chambers. Hence, the complexity of multi-chamber systems relies on different subgames, different types of decision rules and different types of actors. Since collective actors such as parliaments or parliamentary chambers may not act as unitary actors, we examine the power distribution in both types of multi-cahmber legislation by a game-theoretical method with regard to institutional settings and specific legislative schemes . We argue that the Shapley index is the most appropiate method for the comparative analysis of multi chamber power. Our "parallel" research strategy is, thus, based on idividual and corporate Shapley power shares which are subsequently added to collective chamber power. Our comparison of Amerivan and German legislation starts with an analysis of two-chamber parliamentary bergaining. Whereas this application corresponds to the bicameral parliamentary decision stage of conciliation and amending, our second application of Policy Leadership studies the checks-and-balances of all executive and legislative chamber actors. A third application is related to the situation of unified and divided government, and here we examine the power effects of institutional settings and party-oriented strategies in both types of multi-chamber legislation. In Germany, unified government excludes opposition actors, whereas American unified and divided government refers to the president´s role in multi-chamber legislation.</dcterms:abstract> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/42"/> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/> <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/3981/1/Power_and_political.pdf"/> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/3981"/> <dcterms:issued>1996</dcterms:issued> <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/3981/1/Power_and_political.pdf"/> <dc:contributor>Bräuninger, Thomas</dc:contributor> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/42"/> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/jspui"/> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-24T10:09:52Z</dcterms:available> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-24T10:09:52Z</dc:date> <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>
Power_and_political.pdf | 495 |