Power and Political Coordination in American and German Multi-Chamber Legislation

Abstract

Power in American and German multi-chamber legislation is determind either by an institutional or an internal coalition problem of all interlinked chambers. Hence, the complexity of multi-chamber systems relies on different subgames, different types of decision rules and different types of actors. Since collective actors such as parliaments or parliamentary chambers may not act as unitary actors, we examine the power distribution in both types of multi-cahmber legislation by a game-theoretical method with regard to institutional settings and specific legislative schemes . We argue that the Shapley index is the most appropiate method for the comparative analysis of multi chamber power. Our "parallel" research strategy is, thus, based on idividual and corporate Shapley power shares which are subsequently added to collective chamber power. Our comparison of Amerivan and German legislation starts with an analysis of two-chamber parliamentary bergaining. Whereas this application corresponds to the bicameral parliamentary decision stage of conciliation and amending, our second application of Policy Leadership studies the checks-and-balances of all executive and legislative chamber actors. A third application is related to the situation of unified and divided government, and here we examine the power effects of institutional settings and party-oriented strategies in both types of multi-chamber legislation. In Germany, unified government excludes opposition actors, whereas American unified and divided government refers to the president´s role in multi-chamber legislation.