Designing Institutions for Social Dilemmas

Type of Publication: Journal article
Publication status: Published
Author: Rockenbach, Bettina; Wolff, Irenaeus
Year of publication: 2016
Published in: German Economic Review ; 17 (2016), 3. - pp. 316-336. - ISSN 1465-6485. - eISSN 1468-0475
DOI (citable link): https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/geer.12103
Summary:
Considerable experimental evidence has been collected on rules enhancing contributions in public goods dilemmas. These studies either confront subjects with prespecified rules or have subjects choose between different rule environments. In this paper, we completely endogenize the institution design process by asking subjects to design and repeatedly improve rule sets for a public goods problem in order to investigate which rules social planners facing a social dilemma ‘invent’ and how these rules develop over time. We make several noteworthy observations, in particular the strong and successful use of framing, the concealment of individual contribution information and the decreasing use of punishment.
Subject (DDC): 330 Economics
Keywords: Public good; strategy method; experiment; public choice.

Cite This

Files in this item

Files Size Format View

There are no files associated with this item.

ROCKENBACH, Bettina, Irenaeus WOLFF, 2016. Designing Institutions for Social Dilemmas. In: German Economic Review. 17(3), pp. 316-336. ISSN 1465-6485. eISSN 1468-0475. Available under: doi: 10.1111/geer.12103

@article{Rockenbach2016Desig-39806, title={Designing Institutions for Social Dilemmas}, year={2016}, doi={10.1111/geer.12103}, number={3}, volume={17}, issn={1465-6485}, journal={German Economic Review}, pages={316--336}, author={Rockenbach, Bettina and Wolff, Irenaeus} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/39806"> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dc:contributor>Wolff, Irenaeus</dc:contributor> <dc:creator>Wolff, Irenaeus</dc:creator> <dcterms:title>Designing Institutions for Social Dilemmas</dcterms:title> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2017-08-09T12:03:18Z</dcterms:available> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/39806"/> <dc:contributor>Rockenbach, Bettina</dc:contributor> <dc:creator>Rockenbach, Bettina</dc:creator> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/jspui"/> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2017-08-09T12:03:18Z</dc:date> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">Considerable experimental evidence has been collected on rules enhancing contributions in public goods dilemmas. These studies either confront subjects with prespecified rules or have subjects choose between different rule environments. In this paper, we completely endogenize the institution design process by asking subjects to design and repeatedly improve rule sets for a public goods problem in order to investigate which rules social planners facing a social dilemma ‘invent’ and how these rules develop over time. We make several noteworthy observations, in particular the strong and successful use of framing, the concealment of individual contribution information and the decreasing use of punishment.</dcterms:abstract> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dcterms:issued>2016</dcterms:issued> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Search KOPS


Browse

My Account