Designing Institutions for Social Dilemmas

Publikationstyp: Zeitschriftenartikel
Publikationsstatus: Published
Autor/innen: Rockenbach, Bettina; Wolff, Irenaeus
Erscheinungsjahr: 2016
Erschienen in: German Economic Review ; 17 (2016), 3. - S. 316-336. - ISSN 1465-6485. - eISSN 1468-0475
DOI (zitierfähiger Link): https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/geer.12103
Zusammenfassung:
Considerable experimental evidence has been collected on rules enhancing contributions in public goods dilemmas. These studies either confront subjects with prespecified rules or have subjects choose between different rule environments. In this paper, we completely endogenize the institution design process by asking subjects to design and repeatedly improve rule sets for a public goods problem in order to investigate which rules social planners facing a social dilemma ‘invent’ and how these rules develop over time. We make several noteworthy observations, in particular the strong and successful use of framing, the concealment of individual contribution information and the decreasing use of punishment.
Fachgebiet (DDC): 330 Wirtschaft

Zitieren

Dateien zu dieser Ressource

Dateien Größe Format Anzeige

Zu diesem Dokument gibt es keine Dateien.

ROCKENBACH, Bettina, Irenaeus WOLFF, 2016. Designing Institutions for Social Dilemmas. In: German Economic Review. 17(3), pp. 316-336. ISSN 1465-6485. eISSN 1468-0475. Available under: doi: 10.1111/geer.12103

@article{Rockenbach2016Desig-39806, title={Designing Institutions for Social Dilemmas}, year={2016}, doi={10.1111/geer.12103}, number={3}, volume={17}, issn={1465-6485}, journal={German Economic Review}, pages={316--336}, author={Rockenbach, Bettina and Wolff, Irenaeus} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/39806"> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dc:contributor>Wolff, Irenaeus</dc:contributor> <dc:creator>Wolff, Irenaeus</dc:creator> <dcterms:title>Designing Institutions for Social Dilemmas</dcterms:title> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2017-08-09T12:03:18Z</dcterms:available> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/39806"/> <dc:contributor>Rockenbach, Bettina</dc:contributor> <dc:creator>Rockenbach, Bettina</dc:creator> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/jspui"/> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2017-08-09T12:03:18Z</dc:date> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">Considerable experimental evidence has been collected on rules enhancing contributions in public goods dilemmas. These studies either confront subjects with prespecified rules or have subjects choose between different rule environments. In this paper, we completely endogenize the institution design process by asking subjects to design and repeatedly improve rule sets for a public goods problem in order to investigate which rules social planners facing a social dilemma ‘invent’ and how these rules develop over time. We make several noteworthy observations, in particular the strong and successful use of framing, the concealment of individual contribution information and the decreasing use of punishment.</dcterms:abstract> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dcterms:issued>2016</dcterms:issued> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

Das Dokument erscheint in:

KOPS Suche


Stöbern

Mein Benutzerkonto