Strategic recruiting in ongoing hierarchies

Publikationstyp: Zeitschriftenartikel
Publikationsstatus: Published
Autor/innen: Goldlücke, Susanne
Erscheinungsjahr: 2017
Erschienen in: Economics Letters ; 156 (2017). - S. 176-178. - ISSN 0165-1765. - eISSN 1873-7374
DOI (zitierfähiger Link): https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.011
Zusammenfassung:
This paper describes a hierarchy with peer hiring to explore the reasons behind the management rule “A’s hire A’s and B’s hire C’s”. Workers are promoted based on talent and therefore like to hire less talented co-workers. This is why B’s hire C’s. The same logic should cause A’s to hire B’s, but there is a trade-off in the model: A’s are more likely to be promoted, and a manager profits from more talented subordinates. If this effect is strong enough, then indeed A’s hire A’s
Fachgebiet (DDC): 330 Wirtschaft
Universitätsbibliographie: Ja

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GOLDLÜCKE, Susanne, 2017. Strategic recruiting in ongoing hierarchies. In: Economics Letters. 156, pp. 176-178. ISSN 0165-1765. eISSN 1873-7374

@article{Goldlucke2017Strat-39617, title={Strategic recruiting in ongoing hierarchies}, year={2017}, doi={10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.011}, volume={156}, issn={0165-1765}, journal={Economics Letters}, pages={176--178}, author={Goldlücke, Susanne} }

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