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Political alignment and intergovernmental transfers in parliamentary systems : evidence from Germany

Political alignment and intergovernmental transfers in parliamentary systems : evidence from Germany

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BASKARAN, Thushyanthan, Zohal HESSAMI, 2017. Political alignment and intergovernmental transfers in parliamentary systems : evidence from Germany. In: Public Choice. 171(1-2), pp. 75-98. ISSN 0048-5829. eISSN 1573-7101. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s11127-016-0398-4

@article{Baskaran2017Polit-39158, title={Political alignment and intergovernmental transfers in parliamentary systems : evidence from Germany}, year={2017}, doi={10.1007/s11127-016-0398-4}, number={1-2}, volume={171}, issn={0048-5829}, journal={Public Choice}, pages={75--98}, author={Baskaran, Thushyanthan and Hessami, Zohal} }

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