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Bargaining Power in the European Union : An Evaluation of Competing Game-Theoretic Models

Bargaining Power in the European Union : An Evaluation of Competing Game-Theoretic Models

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SCHNEIDER, Gerald, Daniel FINKE, Stefanie BAILER, 2009. Bargaining Power in the European Union : An Evaluation of Competing Game-Theoretic Models. In: Political Studies. 57. Available under: doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00774.x

@article{Schneider2009Barga-3910, title={Bargaining Power in the European Union : An Evaluation of Competing Game-Theoretic Models}, year={2009}, doi={10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00774.x}, volume={57}, journal={Political Studies}, author={Schneider, Gerald and Finke, Daniel and Bailer, Stefanie} }

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