Optimal Savings for Retirement : The Role of Individual Accounts

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LE BLANC, Julia, Almuth SCHOLL, 2017. Optimal Savings for Retirement : The Role of Individual Accounts. In: Macroeconomic Dynamics. 21(06), pp. 1361-1388. ISSN 1365-1005. eISSN 1469-8056. Available under: doi: 10.1017/S1365100515000899

@article{LeBlanc2017-09Optim-36985, title={Optimal Savings for Retirement : The Role of Individual Accounts}, year={2017}, doi={10.1017/S1365100515000899}, number={06}, volume={21}, issn={1365-1005}, journal={Macroeconomic Dynamics}, pages={1361--1388}, author={Le Blanc, Julia and Scholl, Almuth} }

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