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Expectations about coalitions and strategic voting under proportional representation

Expectations about coalitions and strategic voting under proportional representation

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HERRMANN, Michael, 2008. Expectations about coalitions and strategic voting under proportional representation

@techreport{Herrmann2008Expec-35839, series={SFB 504 Discussion Paper}, title={Expectations about coalitions and strategic voting under proportional representation}, year={2008}, number={08-28}, author={Herrmann, Michael} }

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Dateiabrufe seit 07.11.2016 (Informationen über die Zugriffsstatistik)

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