What are the equilibria in linear public-good experiments?

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WOLFF, Irenaeus, 2016. What are the equilibria in linear public-good experiments?

@techreport{Wolff2016equil-34638, series={Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut}, title={What are the equilibria in linear public-good experiments?}, year={2016}, number={105}, author={Wolff, Irenaeus} }

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Dateiabrufe seit 01.07.2016 (Informationen über die Zugriffsstatistik)

Wolff_0-344779.pdf 48

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