Forming the Will Freely

Seebaß, Gottfried

Forming the Will Freely

Files

Forming_seebass.pdf(923.47 KB)

Date

2007

Publication type

Contribution to a collection

Published in

Intentionality, deliberation and autonomy : the action-theoretic basis of practical philosophy / Lumer, Christoph (ed.). - Aldershot : Ashgate, 2007. - pp. 227-241

Abstract

This chapter takes up the classical problem of freewilI, arguing that its traditional understanding remains virulent up to the present and has been unduly declared obsolete by mainstream philosophy. The established division into "compatibilism" and "incompatibiIism" is rejected as misleading. However, after a brief clarification of the relevant notions of 'will' and 'freedom', drawing on the author's extended earlier research, it is argued in detail that it is not possible to meet the two central criteria of 'willing freely' if one subscribes to determinism. First, one cannot specify any relevant notion of practical possibility. Second, unless one accepts strong metaphysical premises, one cannot rely, alternatively, on the criterion of processes of forming the will being "essential" (in some relevant sense) to the person in question. Still it is not necessary to dismiss 'freewill', as the conception of volitional states or processes as indetermined in part is ruled out neither by an unprejudiced scientific view of the world nor by the bad old argument from "blind chance".

Subject (DDC)

100 Philosophy

Cite This

ISO 690

SEEBASS, Gottfried, 2007. Forming the Will Freely. In: LUMER, Christoph, ed.. Intentionality, deliberation and autonomy : the action-theoretic basis of practical philosophy. Aldershot:Ashgate, pp. 227-241

BibTex

@incollection{Seeba2007Formi-3439,
  year={2007},
  title={Forming the Will Freely},
  publisher={Ashgate},
  address={Aldershot},
  booktitle={Intentionality, deliberation and autonomy : the action-theoretic basis of practical philosophy},
  pages={227--241},
  editor={Lumer, Christoph},
  author={Seebaß, Gottfried}
}

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