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Intellectual Property Rights, Global Competition and Transfer of Technology: Prospects for a Global System of Innovation Rights based on the Quasi-Contract of Unjust Enrichment

Intellectual Property Rights, Global Competition and Transfer of Technology: Prospects for a Global System of Innovation Rights based on the Quasi-Contract of Unjust Enrichment

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SUÁREZ BALTODANO, Pedro, 1999. Intellectual Property Rights, Global Competition and Transfer of Technology: Prospects for a Global System of Innovation Rights based on the Quasi-Contract of Unjust Enrichment [Dissertation]. Konstanz: University of Konstanz

@phdthesis{SuarezBaltodano1999Intel-3336, title={Intellectual Property Rights, Global Competition and Transfer of Technology: Prospects for a Global System of Innovation Rights based on the Quasi-Contract of Unjust Enrichment}, year={1999}, author={Suárez Baltodano, Pedro}, address={Konstanz}, school={Universität Konstanz} }

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Dateiabrufe seit 01.10.2014 (Informationen über die Zugriffsstatistik)

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