On the nature of reciprocity : evidence from the ultimatum reciprocity measure

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NICKLISCH, Andreas, Irenaeus WOLFF, 2012. On the nature of reciprocity : evidence from the ultimatum reciprocity measure. In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 84(3), pp. 892-905. ISSN 0167-2681. eISSN 1879-1751. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2012.10.009

@article{Nicklisch2012-12natur-33041, title={On the nature of reciprocity : evidence from the ultimatum reciprocity measure}, year={2012}, doi={10.1016/j.jebo.2012.10.009}, number={3}, volume={84}, issn={0167-2681}, journal={Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}, pages={892--905}, author={Nicklisch, Andreas and Wolff, Irenaeus} }

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