Incentive effects of funding contracts : an experiment

Cite This

Files in this item

Checksum: MD5:8ea0dc47472ccd26822f319c0715522b

REISS, J. Philipp, Irenaeus WOLFF, 2014. Incentive effects of funding contracts : an experiment. In: Experimental Economics. 17(4), pp. 586-614. ISSN 1386-4157. eISSN 1573-6938. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s10683-013-9385-5

@article{Rei2014Incen-32931, title={Incentive effects of funding contracts : an experiment}, year={2014}, doi={10.1007/s10683-013-9385-5}, number={4}, volume={17}, issn={1386-4157}, journal={Experimental Economics}, pages={586--614}, author={Reiß, J. Philipp and Wolff, Irenaeus} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="" xmlns:dc="" xmlns:rdf="" xmlns:bibo="" xmlns:dspace="" xmlns:foaf="" xmlns:void="" xmlns:xsd="" > <rdf:Description rdf:about=""> <dc:creator>Reiß, J. Philipp</dc:creator> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource=""/> <dc:date rdf:datatype="">2016-02-10T10:25:11Z</dc:date> <dc:contributor>Wolff, Irenaeus</dc:contributor> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/jspui"/> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dc:contributor>Reiß, J. Philipp</dc:contributor> <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource=""/> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">We examine the incentive effects of funding contracts on entrepreneurial effort and on allocative efficiency. We experiment with funding contracts that differ in the structure of investor repayment and, thus, in their incentives for the provision of entrepreneurial effort. Theoretically the replacement of a standard debt contract by a repayment-equivalent non-monotonic contract reduces effort distortions and increases efficiency. Likewise, distortions can be mitigated by replacing outside equity by a repayment-equivalent standard-debt contract. We test both hypotheses in the laboratory. Our results reveal that the incentive effects of funding contracts must be experienced before they are reflected in observed behavior. With sufficient experience, observed behavior is either consistent with or close to theoretical predictions and supports both hypotheses. If we allow for entrepreneur-sided manipulations of project outcomes, we find that non-monotonic contracts lose much of their appeal.</dcterms:abstract> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource=""/> <dc:creator>Wolff, Irenaeus</dc:creator> <bibo:uri rdf:resource=""/> <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource=""/> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource=""/> <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="">2016-02-10T10:25:11Z</dcterms:available> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dcterms:issued>2014</dcterms:issued> <dcterms:title>Incentive effects of funding contracts : an experiment</dcterms:title> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

Downloads since Feb 10, 2016 (Information about access statistics)

Reiss_0-320231.pdf 173

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Search KOPS


My Account