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A political-economy perspective on social expenditures : corruption and in-kind versus cash transfers

A political-economy perspective on social expenditures : corruption and in-kind versus cash transfers

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HESSAMI, Zohal, Silke UEBELMESSER, 2016. A political-economy perspective on social expenditures : corruption and in-kind versus cash transfers. In: Economics of Governance. 17(1), pp. 71-100. ISSN 1435-6104. eISSN 1435-8131

@article{Hessami2016polit-32592, title={A political-economy perspective on social expenditures : corruption and in-kind versus cash transfers}, year={2016}, doi={10.1007/s10101-015-0178-5}, number={1}, volume={17}, issn={1435-6104}, journal={Economics of Governance}, pages={71--100}, author={Hessami, Zohal and Uebelmesser, Silke} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/32592"> <dcterms:title>A political-economy perspective on social expenditures : corruption and in-kind versus cash transfers</dcterms:title> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2016-01-14T14:49:56Z</dc:date> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2016-01-14T14:49:56Z</dcterms:available> <dc:contributor>Uebelmesser, Silke</dc:contributor> <dc:creator>Uebelmesser, Silke</dc:creator> <dc:contributor>Hessami, Zohal</dc:contributor> <dc:creator>Hessami, Zohal</dc:creator> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">This paper presents a novel political-economy perspective on the composition of social expenditures. We take into account the possibility that institutions are weak, i.e. there is corruption, and analyze how this affects the government’s choice between cash and in-kind transfers. Our results show that the share of in-kind transfers (e.g. basic health care, public housing or food stamps), whose appropriation by corrupt politicians is more easily observed than in the case of cash transfers, increases with corruption. This positive relationship exists, however, only in highly democratic countries. We argue that voters use their political influence in democratic countries to ensure that a higher share of transfers is provided in kind thereby shielding transfers from appropriation by corrupt politicians.</dcterms:abstract> <dcterms:issued>2016</dcterms:issued> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/32592"/> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

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