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Smoke with Fire : Financial Crises, Institutional Reform, and the Future of EU Democracy

Smoke with Fire : Financial Crises, Institutional Reform, and the Future of EU Democracy

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GENOVESE, Federica, Gerald SCHNEIDER, 2014. Smoke with Fire : Financial Crises, Institutional Reform, and the Future of EU Democracy

@unpublished{Genovese2014Smoke-31908, title={Smoke with Fire : Financial Crises, Institutional Reform, and the Future of EU Democracy}, year={2014}, author={Genovese, Federica and Schneider, Gerald} }

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Dateiabrufe seit 07.10.2015 (Informationen über die Zugriffsstatistik)

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