How Transparency Kills Information Aggregation : Theory and Experiment

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HUGHES, Niall E., Sebastian FEHRLER, 2015. How Transparency Kills Information Aggregation : Theory and Experiment

@techreport{Hughes2015Trans-31772, series={The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)}, title={How Transparency Kills Information Aggregation : Theory and Experiment}, year={2015}, number={1057}, author={Hughes, Niall E. and Fehrler, Sebastian} }

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Dateiabrufe seit 18.09.2015 (Informationen über die Zugriffsstatistik)

Fehrler_0-299455.pdf 89

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