Mandatory implicatures in Gricean pragmatics

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LAUER, Sven, 2014. Mandatory implicatures in Gricean pragmatics. Formal & Experimental Pragmatics Workshop, ESSLI 2014. University of Tübingen, 11. Aug 2014 - 15. Aug 2014. In: DEGEN, Judith, ed., Michael FRANKE, ed., Noah D. GOODMAN, ed.. Proceedings of the Formal & Experimental Pragmatics Workshop. Formal & Experimental Pragmatics Workshop, ESSLI 2014. University of Tübingen, 11. Aug 2014 - 15. Aug 2014, pp. 21-28

@inproceedings{Lauer2014Manda-31386, title={Mandatory implicatures in Gricean pragmatics}, year={2014}, booktitle={Proceedings of the Formal & Experimental Pragmatics Workshop}, pages={21--28}, editor={Degen, Judith and Franke, Michael and Goodman, Noah D.}, author={Lauer, Sven} }

Lauer, Sven Lauer, Sven eng Mandatory implicatures in Gricean pragmatics 2014 Gricean implicatures are often viewed as a very weak kind of<br />implication, viz., as optional enrichments of the literal meaning<br />of an utterance. In virtue of being optional, they need not<br />be present on every occasion of utterance, and they can be explicitly<br />denied. Further, if implicatures are viewed as optional<br />enrichments, a false implicature cannot be the reason why an<br />utterance is infelicitous: If an implicature is known to be false,<br />it should simply fail to arise.<br />I argue that this view is mistaken. There is no reason to think<br />that Gricean reasoning cannot lead to very robust inferences,<br />which are neither optional nor cancelable, and whose falsity<br />can render an utterance infelicitous. Moreover, I point out that<br />a number of explicit recent theories do not exclude such robust<br />implicatures without additional stipulation, and that informal<br />appeal to Gricean reasoning triggering infelicity has been<br />made in the investigation of a number of apparently semantic<br />phenomena. I conclude that implicatures are only weak, optional<br />and cancelable if the pragmatic pressures driving them<br />are context-dependent in a particular way, and further that there<br />is no reason to think that all pressures are of this kind. 2015-07-08T07:41:23Z 2015-07-08T07:41:23Z

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