Decentralized matching and social segregation

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CHEN, Yan, Ernst FEHR, Urs FISCHBACHER, Peter MORGAN, 2015. Decentralized matching and social segregation. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 90, pp. 17-43. ISSN 0899-8256. eISSN 1090-2473. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.11.004

@article{Chen2015Decen-31162, title={Decentralized matching and social segregation}, year={2015}, doi={10.1016/j.geb.2014.11.004}, volume={90}, issn={0899-8256}, journal={Games and Economic Behavior}, pages={17--43}, author={Chen, Yan and Fehr, Ernst and Fischbacher, Urs and Morgan, Peter} }

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