A Quantitative Model of Sovereign Debt, Bailouts and Conditionality

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FINK, Fabian, Almuth SCHOLL, 2014. A Quantitative Model of Sovereign Debt, Bailouts and Conditionality

@unpublished{Fink2014Quant-30492, title={A Quantitative Model of Sovereign Debt, Bailouts and Conditionality}, year={2014}, author={Fink, Fabian and Scholl, Almuth}, note={Revised version of the Konstanz Working Paper 2011-46 (Link in KOPS: http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/21964)} }

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