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Private antitrust enforcement revisited : the role of private incentives to report evidence to the antitrust authority

Private antitrust enforcement revisited : the role of private incentives to report evidence to the antitrust authority

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REUTER, Tim, 2012. Private antitrust enforcement revisited : the role of private incentives to report evidence to the antitrust authority

@techreport{Reuter2012Priva-30414, series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics}, title={Private antitrust enforcement revisited : the role of private incentives to report evidence to the antitrust authority}, year={2012}, number={2012-04}, author={Reuter, Tim} }

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